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Lewisian Fixed Points I:
Two Incomparable Constructions
Tadeusz Litak Albert Visser
Our paper is the first study of what one might call “reverse mathematics
of explicit fixpoints”. We study two methods of constructing such fixpoints
for formulas whose principal connective is the intuitionistic Lewis arrow J.
Our main motivation comes from metatheory of constructive arithmetic,
but the systems in question allows several natural semantics. The first
of these methods, inspired by de Jongh and Visser, turns out to yield a
well-understood modal system iGL−a . The second one by de Jongh and
Sambin, seemingly simpler, leads to a modal theory iA−⊕JS, which proves
harder to axiomatize in an elegant way. Apart from showing that both
theories are incomparable, we axiomatize their join and investigate several
subtheories, whose axioms are obtained as fixpoints of simple formulas. We
also show that both iGL−a and iA
− ⊕ JS are extension stable, that is, their
validity in the corresponding preservativity logic of a given arithmetical
theory transfer to its finite extensions.
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1 Introduction
Provability logic studies propositional and algebraic aspects of arithmetical theories,
their provability predicates and reflection principles. Thanks to Solovay’s arithmetical
completeness result [Sol76], we know that the provability predicate of Peano Arith-
metic [Smo85, BS91, Boo93, Lin96, JdJ98, Sˇve00, AB04, HV14] yields precisely the
famous system GL, also known as the (Go¨del -)Lo¨b logic, obtained from the minimal
unimodal normal logic by adding the principle ( ϕ → ϕ) → ϕ. One of the most
important facts about GL is that it allows definability of explicit fixpoints. That is,
given any polynomial ϕ(p) where all occurrences of p are guarded by , one can use de
Jongh-Sambin algorithm to compute a formula χ not involving p and GL ⊢ χ↔ ϕ(χ);
furthermore, χ thus computed is unique up to propositional equivalence (de Jongh,
Sambin [Sam76], Bernardi [Ber76]). Actually, GL is obtained precisely as the smallest
extension of K4 (i.e., the logic of the transitivity axiom ϕ→ ϕ) in which guarded
fixpoints are definable. This follows immediately from the fact that, by Lo¨b’s argu-
ment, Lo¨b’s principle is entailed by the presence of guarded fixed points in combination
with the de Jongh-Sambin result.
This result encodes the algebraic content of the Lo¨b Theorem and Go¨del’s Second
Incompleteness Theorem. The modal analysis gives us the conceptual resources to
say that the consistency statement is the explicit form of the Go¨del sentence. More
mundanely, it can be seen as elimination of fixpoint operator. The original state-
ment is restricted to guarded fixpoints, but one can indeed extend this classical result
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to elimination of positive fixpoints of ordinary µ-calculus [VB06, Vis05] and further
beyond (see § 12). Given the Kripkean meaning of GL as the logic of Noetherian (con-
versely well-founded) transitive frames, such results in turn have found applications,
e.g., in characterizing expressivity of XPath fragments [tCFL10, § 3.1]. The Sambin-de
Jongh result has inspired Nakano’s seminal work onmodality for recursion [Nak00, § 7],
[Nak01, § 5]. Last, but definitely not the least, it can be used to prove other metare-
sults about GL, such as the Beth definability property, as observed first by Maximova
[Mak89, AHdJ98, Hoo01, IDJZ05] (cf. § 11).
What happens when we broaden the investigation beyond the classical base and unary
provability ? Regarding the former restriction, already Sambin’s 1976 paper [Sam76]
noted that the fixpoint theorem works over intuitionistic propositional calculus (IPC).
Unfortunately, despite decades of efforts [Vis94, Iem01b, Iem01a, Vis08, AM14], there
is no known axiomatization of the provability logic of Heyting Arithmetic (HA) and
related systems; it is a system much stronger than intuitionistic GL, including principles
such as
(¬¬ ϕ→ ϕ)→ ϕ
underivable even in classical GL, as classically it implies ⊥ (cf. [LV18, §5.3] for more
examples). The algebraic core of a weak theory can include powerful schemes refutable
in a stronger theory enjoying a different provability predicate. This phenomenon is
often caused, e.g., by the fact that the weaker theory is closed under some translation
method, whereas the stronger one is not.
Allowing non-unary connectives opens up vast new landscapes, especially in the con-
structive setting. In our paper [LV18], apart from providing a general framework of
schematic logics [LV18, § 5.1], we have made the case for the constructive strict im-
plication J, also called the Lewis arrow. It allows defining ϕ as ⊤ J ϕ. We list its
arithmetical interpretations in § 4. The most important one in the study of metatheory
of HA is provided by ∆-preservativity for a theory T , where ∆ is a class of sentences,
most commonly taken to be Σ01 [Vis85, Vis94, Vis02, Iem03, IDJZ05]. Other ones in-
clude contraposed conservativity/interpretability [Ber90, Sha88, JdJ98, Vis98, AB04]
[LV18, §C.3], the logic of admissible schemes or the -provability interpretation. See
§ 4 for details. Almost needless to say, constructive arithmetic can be replaced by any
other foundational theory rich enough for standard encodings of syntactic notions.
There are also computational interpretations originating elsewhere, such as Hughes
“classical” arrows in functional programming [Hug00, LWY11] (cf. [LV18, § 7.1]).
All these interpretations extend the base system iA− introduced in § 2. Interestingly
enough, not all of them validate principles like Di (cf. § 2) which hold in the standard
Kripke semantics of J (cf. [LV18, § 3] and § 3.2). But what axioms do we need to
ensure fixpoint results, and how can we compute these explicit fixpoints?
3
1.1 Our Contributions
The classical construction of explicit guarded fixed points proceeds in two stages. One
first proves the result for formulas where the main connective is the modal operator
and then one shows how to extend the result to all modalized formulas (and possibly
beyond that). Our results directly concern the first step. See § 12 for a brief discussion
of the second one.
We have two known paradigms for such a construction. First, there is the original
de Jongh-Sambin construction (see § 7) as generalized by Smoryn´ski [Smo85, Ch. 4].
Secondly, there is the construction given by de Jongh and Visser [dJV91] for the
interpretability logic IL (see § 6). As it simplifies to the de Jongh-Sambin construction
when one adds the principle W (see Figure 1), it seemed the master construction. Our
results show that de Jongh-Visser construction and the de Jongh-Sambin construction
are mutually incomparable. The incomparability result also holds in the classical case.
Our paper is the first study of what one might call “reverse mathematic of explicit
fixpoints”. After discussing algebraic and Kripke semantics for extensions of iA− (§ 3),
we investigate the effect of adding explicit schemes stating that a given method (de
Jongh-Visser or de Jongh-Sambin) indeed yields fixpoints of formulas whose principal
connective is J. This, however, requires a significant prerequisite: we noted above that
the validity of a scheme in the logic (algebraic core) of a given arithmetical theory (§ 4)
does not need to transfer to the logic of some given finite extension. As we show in
a companion paper [LV], this holds if the base logic enjoys the property of extension
stability. After recalling this information (§ 5), we show that the minimal theory
in which the de Jongh-Visser construction works is the theory iGL−a (§ 6), which is
extension stable. Thus, for the de Jongh-Visser construction we have a precise analogue
of Lo¨b’s Logic. In § 7 we show that the case of the de Jongh-Sambin construction is
more complex and show the incomparability of its theory (iA− ⊕ JS, which also turns
out to be extension stable) with iGL−a . In § 8 we axiomatize the join of both theories.
In § 9 we investigate several subtheories of iA− ⊕ JS, whose axioms are obtained as de
Jongh-Sambin fixpoints of simple formulas. A large part of our results on axiomatizing
explicit fixpoints is concisely summarized by Figure 2 therein. In § 10 we present
Kripke semantics for some principles investigated in earlier sections and uncover a
simple nonconservativity phenomenon.
2 Basics
Our basic system is iA−in the language of intuitionistic propositional calculus (IPC)
extended with a binary connective J. We write ϕ for ⊤ J ϕ. The system is given
by the following axioms:
prop axioms and rules for IPC
Tr ((ϕ J ψ) ∧ (ψ J χ))→ (ϕ J χ)
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Ka ((ϕ J ψ) ∧ (ϕ J χ))→ (ϕ J (ψ ∧ χ))
Na ⊢ ϕ→ ψ ⇒ ⊢ ϕ J ψ
We take ϕ := ⊤ J ϕ and ϕ for ϕ ∧ ϕ. One can easily derive the intuitionistic
version of the classical system K (without 3) for the -language from iA−. The system
iA extends iA− with
Di ((ϕ J χ) ∧ (ψ J χ))→ ((ϕ ∨ ψ) J χ)
A (iA−-)logic Λ is an extension of iA− that is closed under modus ponens, necessitation
and substitution. Let X be a set of formulas. We write Λ⊕X for the closure of Λ∪X
under modus ponens and necessitation. Note that Λ⊕X is not automatically a logic.
On the other hand, if X is closed under substitution, then so is Λ⊕X .
Remark 2.1. All theorems we claim for iA− also hold when we omit disjunction from
the language, in the sense that we still have all schemes, where the interpretations of
the schematic letters are restricted to disjunction-free formulas. Our proofs also work
in the disjunction-free setting.
Theorems 10.3 and 10.4 illustrate that Di is sometimes needed to derive principles not
involving ∨. A similar example is provided by the trivialization of J in iA ⊕ CPC
[LV18, Lemma 4.6]. In the latter case, we know we need Di to make the argument
work since the classical interpretability logic IL does not trivialize. ❍
At some points, we will use a convenient notation for substitution. Suppose a variable,
say r, of substitution is given in the context. We will write ϕψ for ϕ[r := ψ]. We note
that (ϕψ)χ is equal to ϕ(ψχ). So we may write ϕψχ.
Lemma 2.2. Let a designated variable of substitution r be given. We have:
Sub1 iA− ⊕ 4 ⊢ (ϕ↔ ψ)→ (χϕ↔ χψ).
Sub2 Suppose every occurrence of r is in the scope of an occurrence J in χ. We have:
iA− ⊕ 4 ⊢ (ϕ↔ ψ)→ (χϕ↔ χψ).
Proof. We prove Sub1 by induction on χ. The only interesting case is where χ = ν0 J
ν1. By the Induction Hypothesis, for i = 0, 1, we have:
iA− ⊕ 4 ⊢ (ϕ↔ ψ)→ (νiϕ↔ νiψ).
It follows that:
iA− ⊕ 4 ⊢ (ϕ↔ ψ)→ (νiϕ↔ νiψ)
and, hence that:
iA− ⊕ 4 ⊢ (ϕ↔ ψ)→ (νiϕL νiψ).
The desired result is now immediate.
We prove Sub2. Suppose χ = ν0 J ν1. We have, by Sub1,
iA− ⊕ 4 ⊢ (ϕ↔ ψ)→ (νiϕ↔ νiψ).
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Hence,
iA
− ⊕ 4 ⊢ ( (ϕ↔ ψ)→ (νiϕ↔ νiψ)).
So,
iA− ⊕ 4 ⊢ (ϕ↔ ψ)→ (νiϕ↔ νiψ).
Ergo, since iA− ⊕ 4 ⊢ ϕ→ ϕ, we find:
iA− ⊕ 4 ⊢ (ϕ↔ ψ)→ (νiϕL νiψ).
Thus the desired result follows for the case that χ = ν0 J ν1.The remaining cases are
by induction on outer non-modal propositional connectives. ❑
Lemma 2.3. (Uniqueness of fixpoints) Fix a designated variable of substitution r.
Suppose every occurrence of r is in the scope of an occurrence J in χ. Suppose q does
not occur in χ. We have:
a. iA− ⊕ L ⊢ ( (r ↔ χr) ∧ (q ↔ χq))→ (r ↔ q).
b. iA− ⊕ L ⊢ ( (r ↔ χr) ∧ (q ↔ χq))→ (r ↔ q).
c. iA− ⊕ L ⊢ ( (r ↔ χr) ∧ (q ↔ χq))→ (r ↔ q).
Proof. We use the familiar fact that we have 4 in iA− ⊕ L . It is easy to see that we
have the strengthened Lo¨b’s Rule in iA− ⊕ L , to wit:
if iA− ⊕ L ⊢ (
∧
i<n ϕi ∧ ψ)→ ψ, then iA
− ⊕ L ⊢
∧
i<n ϕi → ψ.
We use this rule in our proof. We only prove (a), as items (b) and (c) follow then
immediately. We reason in iA−⊕L . Suppose (r ↔ χr) and (q ↔ χq) and (r ↔ q).
Since we have 4 , we also have Sub2 and, hence, χr ↔ χq. Thus we find r ↔ q. By the
strengthened Lo¨b’s Rule, we may conclude r ↔ q without the assumption of (r ↔ q).
❑
Remark 2.4. We find a closely related development in Craig Smoryn´ski’s [Smo85,
Chapter 4]. We note that our development is constructive and studies a binary op-
erator, where Smoryn´ski works classically and studies a unary operator. Moreover,
since Smoryn´ski aims at a version of the de Jongh-Sambin Theorem, he imposes an
additional axiom written (in an adjusted notation) as ⊢ △ϕ→ △ϕ. ❍
3 Semantics
Most proofs in this paper are of purely syntactic nature. Nevertheless, we occasionally
still need semantics, e.g., for non-derivability results and for better understanding of
syntactic systems and notions studied below. For our purposes, it is enough to consider
algebraic semantics (§ 3.1) and Kripke semantics (§ 3.2).
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3.1 Algebraic Semantics
We briefly recapitulate algebraic semantics as discussed in our companion paper [LV].
A generic algebraic completeness result after the manner of Lindenbaum and Tarski is
obtainable for almost any “natural” logic and extensions of iA− are no exception. We
can in fact put it in a general setting: with their The “global consequence relation”
of any extension of iA− including both Modus Ponens and Na is easily seen to be
algebraizable [BP89, FJP03], in fact an instance of what Rasiowa calls an implicative
logic [Ras74, Fon06]. More explicitly, the algebraic semantics looks as follows:
Definition 3.1. A J-algebra or iA−-algebra is a tuple A := 〈A,∧,∨,J,→,⊥,⊤〉,
where
• 〈A,∧,∨,→,⊥,⊤〉 (the intuitionistic/Heyting reduct of A) is a Heyting algebra
and
• 〈A,∧,∨,J,⊥,⊤〉 (the strict reduct of A) satisfies
CK (a J b) ∧ (a J c) = a J (b ∧ c),
CT (a J b) ∧ (b J c) ≤ a J c,
CI a J a = ⊤.
Moreover, A is a normalized or iA-algebra if its strict reduct is a weakly Heyting
algebra [CJ05], i.e., it satisfies in addition
CD (a J c) ∧ (b J c) = (a ∨ b) J c.
❍
CK, CD, CT, and CI are called by Celani and Jansana [CJ05] C1 –C4, respectively.
Denote the equational class of J-algebras by J -haes (haes standing for “Heyting
Algebra Expansions”) and the class of normalized ones by Di-haes.
A valuation v in A as usual maps propositional atoms to elements of A and is induc-
tively extended to vˆ defined on all formulas in the obvious way. Write A, v  ϕ if
vˆ(ϕ) = ⊤, A  ϕ if A, v  ϕ for all ϕ, A  Λ if A  ϕ for every ϕ ∈ Λ, and K  ϕ if
A  ϕ for every A ∈ K. Given any K ⊆J -haes and any set of formulas Λ define
Mod(Λ) := {A | ∀ϕ ∈ Λ.A  ϕ},
Th(K) := {ϕ | ∀A ∈ K.A  ϕ}.
Theorem 3.2 (Algebraic Completeness).
• For any K ⊆J-haes, Th(K) is a logic.
• For any logic Λ, Λ = Th(Mod(Λ)).
Proof. See our companion paper [LV] or apply techniques of abstract algebraic logic
(AAL) as discussed in standard references [BP89, FJP03, Ras74, Fon06]. ❑
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3.2 Kripke Semantics
We briefly recapitulate basic information from our overview [LV18]. A (Lewisian)
Kripke frame is a triple F := 〈W,,<〉, where  is a partial order on W , < ⊆ W ×W
and furthermore
J-p if k  ℓ < m, then k < m (i.e., · < ⊆ <).
Admissible valuations then map propositional atoms to -closed sets and intuitionistic
connectives are interpreted as usual using . The clause for J in a model is
k  ϕ J ψ if, for all ℓ = k, if ℓ  ϕ, then ℓ  ψ. (1)
Given such a Kripke frame, it is an easy exercise to define its dual algebra whose
Heyting reduct is given as usual by Up(W ), i.e., upsets of W , and the strict reduct
(interpretation of J) is induced by (1). The dual algebra is normalized, i.e., the
equality CD corresponding to Di holds. In other words, extensions of iA− which are
not extensions of iA can only be Kripke sound, but not Kripke complete. A fuller
discussion of Di and other principles in the Kripke setting (written without employing
explicitly algebraic language) can be found in our paper [LV18]. Definitions of notions
such as the finite model property (fmp), i.e., completeness wrt a finite class of frames
are standard.
Some modal axioms that we need together with their correspondence conditions are
given in Figure 1. Its fuller version can be found in [LV18, § 6], along with an extended
version of the following summary of existing results.
Theorem 3.3.
a. iA has the finite model property [Iem01b, Prop. 4.1.1], [Iem03, Prop. 7], [Zho03,
Th. 2.1.10].
b. i-BoxA = iA+Box (i-SA = iA+S, iA+4 ) correspond to the class of brilliant frames
(strong frames, semi-transitive frames) and enjoy the fmp.
c. iA+4a corresponds to the class of gathering frames and has the fmp [Iem01b, Prop.
4.2.1], [Iem03, Prop. 8].
d. iA + L corresponds to the class of Noetherian semi-transitive frames and has the
fmp [Iem01b, Prop. 4.3.2], [Zho03, Th. 2.2.7].
e. i-GLa = iA+L +4a corresponds to the class of Noetherian gathering frames [Iem03,
Lem. 9], [IDJZ05, Lem. 3.10] and has the fmp.
f. i-GW = iA + W corresponds to the “supergathering” property of Figure 1 on the
class of finite frames [Zho03, Lem. 3.5.1], [IDJZ05, Th. 3.31].
Open Question 3.4. Are i-GW and related systems involving W Kripke complete?
❍
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Box
ϕ J ψ → (ϕ→ ψ)
brilliant
k < ℓ  m ⇒ k < m
m
k
>>>~
>~
///o ℓ
OO
4
ϕ→ ϕ
semi-transitive
k < ℓ < m ⇒
∃x.k < x  m
x //❴❴ m
k
OO
O
O
///o/o ℓ
OO
O
O
4a
ϕ J ϕ
gathering
k < ℓ < m ⇒ ℓ  m k ///o/o/o ℓ 66❚ ❴ ❥
((4t 2r /o ,l *j
m
L ( ϕ→ ϕ)→ ϕ
Lo¨b: <-Noetherian (conversely well-founded) and
semi-transitive
W
((ϕ ∧ ψ) J ψ)→ ϕ J ψ
supergathering
on finite frames:
k < ℓ < m⇒ ∃x = k.(ℓ ≺ x  m)
x //❴❴ m
k
???
?
///o/o/o/o/o ℓ
6=
`` OO
O
S
ϕ→ ϕ
strong
k < ℓ ⇒ k  ℓ k 77❚ ❴ ❥
''5u 2r /o ,l )i
ℓ
Figure 1: Basic axioms and their correspondence conditions [LV18, § 6]. Further cor-
respondence conditions are provided in § 10.
Remark 3.5. There are other semantics for iA− and iA, which are intermediate be-
tween algebraic and Kripke ones. We do not treat them here, as our paper is primarily
syntactic in nature, but in subsequent work we are going to discuss, e.g., suitable
generalizations of so-called Veltman semantics, or semantics merging Kripkean inter-
pretation of intuitionistic connectives with nieghbourhood interpretation of J. ❍
4 Arithmetical Interpretations
Our paper [LV18] proposed a general framework of schematic logics [LV18, § 5.1] for
arithmetical interpretations of logical systems, in particular extensions of iA−. It can
be also seen as semantics of propositional modal logics and this aspect is our main
focus here. Let us present the framework restricted to the J-signature.
We restrict ourselves in our presentation to theories extending the intuitionistic ver-
sion of Elementary Arithmetic in the same language. Intuitionistic Elementary Arith-
metic consists of the basic axioms for successor, addition and muliplication plus ∆0-
induction, plus an axiom expressing the exponentiation is total over intuitionistic pred-
icate logic. We assume that a Σ01-formula σT representing the given axiom set of T
is part of the data for T . NB: we thus treat arithmetical theories differently from
propositional logics that are given as sets of sentences.
Let a function F that assigns to T an arithmetical formula AT (v0, v1) as interpreta-
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tion of J. We note that F operates intensionally on σT . We write B0 JF,T B1 for
F (T )(pB0q, pB1q). Here pCq is the numeral of the Go¨del number of C. Suppose f is a
mapping from the propositional atoms to arithmetical sentences. We define (ϕ)fF,T as
the translation that uses f to interpret atoms, JF,T to interpret J, and that commutes
with the propositional connectives.
We say that ϕ is T -valid w.r.t. F if, for all assignments f of arithmetical sentences
to the propositional atoms, we have T ⊢ (ϕ)fF,T . We write ΛF (T ) for the set of modal
formulas that are T -valid w.r.t. F . Here are several examples of interpretations fitting
in this framework, each of which yields a logic extending iA−.
• The most important one is provided by Λ◦∆(T ), i.e., ∆-preservativity for a theory
T , where ∆ is a class of sentences. We assume that ∆ is given by an elementary
formula, say δ, that arithmetically represents it. We define:
◦ A J∆,T B if, for all ∆-sentences S, if T ⊢ S → A, then T ⊢ S → B.
We note that J∆,T is a rather uniform interpretation. There is an arithmetical for-
mula P (v0, v1,X, Y ) with two free second order variables, such that B0 J∆,T B1 =
P (pB0q, pB1q, σT , δ).
A minimal assumption on ∆ is that it includes a sentence (equivalent to) ⊤.
Let us call such ∆ preservation-suitable. This ensures, in particular, that ϕ
defined as ⊤ J ϕ still encodes provability. It is most common to fix ∆ as
Σ01 [Vis85, Vis94, Vis02, Iem03, IDJZ05], in which case we drop ∆ (cf. [LV18,
§ 5] for the notation). The relation of Σ01-preservativity is an important tool in
the study of metatheory of HA. In particular, constructive preservativity logic
appears easier to analyze than its provability fragment. See [LV18] for further
motivation.
• Classically, preservativity is seen as contraposed form of conservativity, which
in turn is classically equivalent to interpretability [Ber90, Sha88, JdJ98, Vis98,
AB04] [LV18, C.3]. It is also possible to investigate constructive interpretability
logic, although it appears somewhat less well-motivated [LV18, C.4].
• Yet another example of a schematic interpretation is provided by the -translation.
That is, J is interpreted as ((ϕ ∧ ϕ) → (ψ ∧ ψ)), where is the ordinary
provability modality.
• An example of an arithmetical interpretation not fitting well into the schematic
framework sketched above is provided by the logic of admissible schemes: i.e.,
ϕ J ψ is valid if whenever an arithmetical instance of ϕ is provable, so is the
corresponding instance of ψ. We postpone a detailed discussion to a later work.
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5 Extension Stability
The main focus of our paper is axiomatizing principles yielding explicit fixpoints in the
logic ΛF (T ) of an arithmetical theory T (relative to chosen F ). Nevertheless, we have
already mentioned that regardless of the interpretation of J, ΛF (·) is not necessarily
monotone: T ⊆ T ′ does not entail that ΛF (T ) ⊆ ΛF (T
′). We thus would like to know
that when our fixpoint principles hold in ΛF (T ) for a base theory T , they also hold
in ΛF (T
′) whenever T ′ is, say, a finite extension of T . Otherwise, they would appear
rather fickle. Thus, we are led to the notion of extension stability. Apart from being
central for our arithmetical (reverse) correspondence theory, it seems to be of interest
for ordinary modal model theory; it turns out to be an overlooked generalization of
the notion of subframe logic [Fin85, Wol93]. Recall that Lo¨b-like logics, while being
in general non-elementary, tend to be subframe, which above classical K4 ensures nice
completeness properties. The details are discussed in a companion paper [LV]; we just
recapitulate basics here.
Given ϕ and a fresh propositional variable p, define translation ϕ⌈p⌉ inductively as
commuting with the propositional variables and the connectives of IPC, with the J
clause being
(ψ J χ)⌈p⌉ := ((p→ ψ⌈p⌉) J (p→ χ⌈p⌉)).
As ϕ is ⊤ J ϕ, we get iA− ⊢ ( ϕ)⌈p⌉ ↔ (p→ ϕ⌈p⌉).
A logic Λ is extension stable if, whenever Λ ⊢ ϕ and p not in ϕ, we have Λ ⊢ p→ ϕ⌈p⌉.
Theorem 5.1 ([LV]). Suppose the logic Λ is axiomatized over iA− by Γ (w.r.t. the
iA−-rules Modus Ponens and Necessitation) and suppose that, for every ϕ ∈ Γ and p
not in ϕ, we have Λ ⊢ p→ ϕ⌈p⌉. Then Λ is extension stable.
Definition 5.2. We say that F is an elegant interpretation if for any recursively
axiomatizable arithmetical theory U and any arithmetical sentences A,B,C, we have
that
U ⊢ B JF,U+A C ↔ (A→ B) JF,U (A→ C).
❍
Theorem 5.3 ([LV]). For any preservation-suitable ∆, ∆-preservativity is an elegant
interpretation.
Theorem 5.4 ([LV]). Whenever F is an elegant interpretation and U is a recursively
axiomatizable theory, S(ΛF (U)) is of the form
⋂
A
ΛF (U +A), where A is ranging over
all arithmetical sentences. Consequently, Λ(U) is extension stable iff for all A we have
ΛF (U) ⊆ ΛF (U +A).
Remark 5.5. We could also build the inverse: consider the ϕ⌈p⌉ for Λ ⊢ ϕ, where
p 6∈ var(ϕ), and close off to make it a logic. This gives an extension of Λ.
Interestingly, this construction yields the well-known Kripke proof of Lo¨b’s Theorem
from Go¨del’s theorem in the classical case: if we start with iA− plus the excluded
11
middle plus ⊤, we get L . Similarly, we get ( ϕ → ϕ) J ϕ from ⊤ J ⊥. Regret-
tably, we need the excluded middle here to get rid of negations that weaken the result
constructively. ❍
Example 5.6. The following examples are discussed in the companion paper [LV].
+ Positive examples of extension stability: the interpretability logic ILM of all
classical sequential essentially reflexive theories ([Sha88], [Ber90], [JdJ98], or
[AB04]) and the logic ILP of all finitely axiomatized classical arithmetical theories
extending I∆0 + supexp [Vis90a].
- Failure of extension stability: the interpretability logic of Elementary Arithmetic
EA [Kal91], the Σ1-preservativity logic of HA [LV] , closure under the Friedman
translation [Vis94].
Open Question 5.7. Axiomatize the provability logic and the preservativity logic of
all finite extensions of HA. ❍
6 iGL−a Meets JV
In this section we study a fixed point calculation that is due to de Jongh and Visser
[dJV91], originally in the context of the classical interpretability logic IL. It transfers
naturally to the context of the Lewis arrow in the presence of axiom La, as observed
first by Iemhoff et al. [IDJZ05]. We will call the scheme that corresponds to the de
Jongh-Visser calculation JV, show that it allows deriving La (hence La is precisely the
logic of this construction) and that the resulting logic is extension stable.
We define iGL−a as iA
− ⊕ La, where:
La ( ϕ→ ϕ) J ϕ.
iA− ⊕ L ⊕ 4a coincides with iGL
−
a [LV18, Lemma 4.11].
Remark 6.1. If we add classical logic to iGL−a and replace J by the contraposed
operator , we obtain the interpretability logic IL. We note that Di is not valid in
contraposed IL. See [Vis90b] and [dJV91]. ❍
We have the symmetric Lo¨b rule:
sLRa ϕ ⊢ ϕ↔ ψ ⇒ ⊢ ϕL ψ.
Lemma 6.2. The rule sLRa is admissible for iGL
−
a .
Proof. Suppose ϕ ⊢
iGL
−
a
ϕ↔ ψ. It follows that ψ ⊢
iGL
−
a
ϕ → ϕ. Hence, by Na, we
find ⊢
iGL
−
a
ψ J ( ϕ→ ϕ) and, thus, by La, ⊢iGL−a ψ J ϕ.
For the converse direction, we have ϕ ⊢
iGL
−
a
ψ. Hence, ⊢
iGL
−
a
ϕ J ψ. Since, by 4a,
we have ⊢
iGL
−
a
ϕ J ϕ, by Tr, we find ⊢
iGL
−
a
ϕ J ψ. ❑
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It has been noted by Iemhoff et al. [IDJZ05] that the following result, first obtained
in the classical setting [dJV91], holds constructively as well.
Theorem 6.3. Let ϕ := ψ J χ and θ := (ψ χ⊤ J χ⊤). Then, we have iGL−a ⊢ θ ↔
ϕθ.
Proof. We have χ⊤ ⊢
iGL
−
a
θ. Hence, χ⊤ ⊢
iGL
−
a
(⊤ ↔ θ). So, it follows that
χ⊤ ⊢
iGL
−
a
χ⊤ ↔ χθ. Hence, by sLRa, (a) ⊢iGL−a χ⊤L χθ.
We have ψ χ⊤ ⊢
iGL
−
a
χ⊤ ↔ θ. (We note that this step already works in iA−.) So,
ψ χ⊤ ⊢
iGL
−
a
ψ χ⊤ ↔ ψθ. Thus, by sLRa, we find (b): ⊢iGL−a ψ χ⊤L ψθ.
Combining (a) and (b), we now have:
iGL
−
a ⊢ θ ↔ (ψ χ⊤ J χ⊤)
↔ (ψθ J χθ)
↔ ϕθ ❑
We note that θ can also be written as (ψ p J p)χ⊤ or as (ψ χ J χ)⊤.
We define the principle JV as follows:
JV (ψ χ⊤ J χ⊤) ↔ (ψ J χ)(ψ χ⊤ J χ⊤)
We have seen that iGL−a ⊢ JV. We now show that, conversely, iA
− ⊕ JV ⊢ La, and,
hence, iA− ⊕ JV coincides with iGL−a .
Theorem 6.4. iA− ⊕ JV ⊢ La.
Proof. The JV-fixed point of (p → ϕ), where p does not occur in ϕ, is (⊤ → ϕ).
This tells us that we, iA− ⊕ JV-verifiably, have L . It follows, by Lemma 2.3, that we
have uniqueness of fixed points in iA− ⊕ JV. Now consider the formula (p → ϕ) J ϕ,
where p does not occur in ϕ. On the one hand, ⊤ is a fixed point of this formula
even over iA−. On the other hand, JV gives us ( ϕ → ϕ) J ϕ as a fixed point. By
uniqueness, we find that ( ϕ→ ϕ) J ϕ is iA− ⊕ JV-provable. ❑
We note that, in the proof of Theorem 6.4, we used that we are allowed to choose p
locally. We summarize Theorems 6.3 and 6.4 in one statement.
Corollary 6.5. iGL−a coincides with iA
− ⊕ JV.
We see that it follows from that iA− ⊕ JV is indeed a logic in that it is closed under
substitution. This could have been proven, of course, without the detour over the
characterization.
Theorem 6.6. iA− ⊕ JV is extension stable.
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Proof. It is sufficient to show that iGL−a is extension stable. We leave the verification
that iA− is extension stable to the reader. We have:
(( ϕ→ ϕ) J ϕ)⌈p⌉ = (p→ ( (p→ ϕ⌈p⌉)→ ϕ⌈p⌉)) J (p→ ϕ⌈p⌉).
Clearly,
(†) iA− ⊢ (( ϕ→ ϕ) J ϕ)⌈p⌉ ↔ ( (p→ ϕ⌈p⌉)→ (p→ ϕ⌈p⌉)) J (p→ ϕ⌈p⌉).
The right-hand-side of (†) is an instance of La. ❑
We end this section by comparing iGL−a to the stronger theory iGLW
−. We remind the
reader that the principle W can be equivalently written as
W (ϕ J ψ)→ (( ψ → ϕ) J ψ).
We define iGLW− := iA− ⊕ W. It is known that this is a stronger logic than iA−
[IDJZ05]. To separate iGL−a from iGLW
−, we use here a lemma that is an adaptation
of an example from de Jongh and Visser [dJV91, p. 48].
Lemma 6.7. iGL−a 0 ( ⊥ J ⊥)→ ⊥.
Proof. We can show that iGL−a 0 ( ⊥ J ⊥) → ⊥ on a three point Kripke model.
See [LV18, Example 6.7]. ❑
Theorem 6.8. iGLW
− strictly extends iGL−a .
Proof. To see that iGLW− extends iGL−a , we note that specializing W by taking ψ := ϕ
gives us La over iA
−.
We take ϕ := ⊥ and ψ := ⊥ in iGLW−. This gives us iGLW− ⊢ ( ⊥ J ⊥) → ⊥.
By Lemma 6.7, iGL−a 0 ( ⊥ J ⊥)→ ⊥. ❑
7 JS
We proceed with the study of explicit fixed points in the style of de Jongh and Sambin.
We define JS as follows.
JS (ψ J χ)⊤ ↔ (ψ J χ)(ψ J χ)⊤.
Written differently:
(ψ⊤ J χ⊤)↔ (ψ J χ)(ψ⊤ J χ⊤)
The principle JS is prima facie simpler than JV, however, the impression is somewhat
misleading. As we will see, over iA−, neither principle implies the other.
We begin with a natural preliminary result:
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Theorem 7.1. iA− ⊕ JS is a logic.
We remind the reader that the results of applying ⊕ are not automatically closed under
substitution.
Proof. Suppose that q is distinct from the variables in ψ and χ and that q is distinct
from the substitution variable p. Let ν be given. By possibly renaming the substitution
variable p we can arrange that p does not occur in ν. We have:
(λq.((ψ J χ)⊤ ↔ (ψ J χ)(ψ J χ)⊤))ν =
((λq.ψ)ν J (λq.χ)ν)⊤ ↔
(((λq.ψ)ν J (λq.χ)ν)((λq.ψ)ν J (λq.χ)ν)⊤).
The result of substitution is again an instance of JS. ❑
Theorem 7.2. iA− ⊕ JS is extension stable.
Proof. Let q be distinct from the variables in ψ and χ and from the substitution
variable p.
We have:
((ψ J χ)⊤ ↔ (ψ J χ)(ψ J χ)⊤)⌈q⌉ =
(((q → ψ⌈q⌉) J (q → χ⌈q⌉))⊤ ↔ ((q → ψ⌈q⌉) J
(q → χ⌈q⌉))((q → ψ⌈q⌉) J (q → χ⌈q⌉))⊤).
The resulting formula is again an instance of JS. ❑
The proof of the following theorem is essentially due to de Jongh and Visser [dJV91].
In the intuitionistic setting, it has been also noted by Iemhoff et al. [IDJZ05].
Theorem 7.3. iGLW− ⊢ JS.
Proof. Since iGLW− extends iGL−a , we have JV in iGLW
−. Moreover:
iGLW− ⊢ (ψ χ⊤ J χ⊤) ↔ (( χ⊤ → ψ χ⊤) J χ⊤)
↔ (( χ⊤ → ψ⊤) J χ⊤)
↔ (ψ⊤ J χ⊤)
Here the first and third equivalences are instances of W and the second equivalence
is an instance of the substitution principle Su1, noting that χ⊤ is equivalent to
( χ⊤ ↔ ⊤). ❑
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Now consider the principle
P (ϕ J ψ)→ (ϕ J ψ).
We define iGLP− := iA− ⊕ L ⊕ P.
We prove JS in iGLP−. The development here is essentially the one from Smoryn´ski’s
[Smo85, Chapter 4].
Theorem 7.4. iGLP− ⊢ JS.
Proof. We reason in iGLP−.
Suppose (ψ J χ)⊤. Then, ((ψ J χ)⊤ ↔ ⊤). Hence, (ψ J χ)(ψ J χ)⊤.
Conversely, suppose (ψ J χ)(ψ J χ)⊤ and (ψ J χ)⊤. From the latter we can derive
((ψ J χ)⊤ ↔ ⊤).
Since in (ψ J χ)(ψ J χ)⊤ the formula (ψ J χ)⊤ occurs only modalized, we find:
(ψ J χ)⊤. By Lo¨b’s Rule, we may drop the assumption (ψ J χ)⊤. ❑
We end this section by showing some incomparability results.
Lemma 7.5. iGLP 0 4a. Consequently, iGLP is not a subtheory of iGL
−
a .
Proof. If over iGL we define ϕ J ψ as (ϕ → ψ) this validates an extension of iGLP.
However, 4a would translate to (ϕ → ϕ), which is obviously not in iGLP, or even
in the classical version theoreof; let us recall a trivial proof. We can consider the
Kripke model on three different points a, b, c. We take < := {〈a, b〉, 〈a, c〉, 〈b, c〉} and
 = {〈a, a〉, 〈b, b〉, 〈c, c〉} (that is, a classical model). Let b  p and c 1 p. Then, the
model satisfies iGLP but a 1 p J p. ❑
In fact, the non-containment goes both ways, i.e., extends to incomparability.
Theorem 7.6. iGLP− is not contained in iGLW (and a fortiori not in iGLa) .
Proof. One possible argument is via interpretability logic, however this only works for
non-containment in iGLW−.1 Thus, consider the following Kripke frame:
a < b ≺ c ≺ d, a < c, b < d, b ≺ d.
We set that d  p and p does not hold anywhere else. This model is easily seen to be
supergathering but a does not validate p J ⊥ → (p J ⊥). ❑
1Suppose we extend iGLW− and iGLP− with classical logic, and we add 4a, and we switch to the
contraposed reading . We thus obtain, respectively, the interpretability logics ILW and ILP. It is
well known that ILP strictly extends ILW. So it follows that iGLP− is not a subtheory of iGLW−.
Hence, a fortiori, it is not a subtheory of iGL−a .
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We note that iGLW− ⊆ iGLP− ⊕ 4a = iGL
−
a ⊕W.
Since iA−⊕JS is contained in the incomparable theories iGLW− and iGLP−, it is strictly
contained is both.
Theorem 7.7. The theory iA− ⊕ JS is strictly contained in iGLW− and iGLP−.
Theorem 7.8. iGL−a is incomparable to iA
− ⊕ JS.
Proof. iGL−a proves 4a, but, by Lemma 7.5, iGLP
− does not. So, a fortiori, iA− ⊕ JS
does not prove 4a.
By considering the fixed point of p J ⊥, we see that iA−⊕JS proves ( ⊥ J ⊥)→ ⊥.
However, by Lemma 6.7, iGL−a does not. ❑
Open Question 7.9. Can we give an interesting characterization of iA− ⊕ JS? E.g.
can we derive it from finitely many schematic fixed point equations? Or can we refute
that this is possible? In the rest of this paper we will make the question a bit more
specific. ❍
8 The Join of JV and JS
What happens if we add an axiom that says that the JV-fixed point of ψ J χ is equal
to the JS-fixed point?
Consider the scheme:
X (ψ χ⊤ J χ⊤)↔ (ψ J χ)⊤.
Theorem 8.1. iA− ⊕ X ⊢W.
Proof. Consider the formula (p → ϕ) J ψ, where p does not occur in ϕ and ψ. The
JV-fixed point of (p → ϕ) J ψ is ( ψ → ϕ) J ψ and the JS-fixed point is modulo
iA−-provable equivalence ϕ J ψ. ❑
Corollary 8.2. The following theories are equal: iA−⊕ JV⊕ JS, iA−⊕X and iGLW−.
Proof. Since iA−⊕JV⊕JS extends iGL−, we have uniqueness of fixed points and hence
X. Moreover, iA− ⊕ X ⊢ W. Finally, we have already seen that iGLW− proves JS and
JV. ❑
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JV
(ψ χ⊤ J χ⊤)
↔ (ψ J χ)(ψ χ⊤ J χ⊤)
the de Jongh-Visser scheme
of explicit fixpoints iGLW− iGLP−
iA
− ⊕ JS
(
✻
(
✛
iA
− ⊕ JV = iGL−a
(
✻
iGLW
◦−
⊆
✻
iGL
◦−
a
(
✻
(
✲
La ( ϕ→ ϕ) J ϕ its direct axiomatization
JS
(ψ⊤ J χ⊤)
↔ (ψ J χ)(ψ⊤ J χ⊤)
the de Jongh-Sambin scheme
of explicit fixpoints
P (ϕ J ψ)→ (ϕ J ψ)
one of principles ensuring it
holds over L
W◦
((ϕ ∧ (ϕ J ψ)) J ψ)
→ (ϕ J ψ)
the most powerful
consequence of JS we know
W∗
(ϕ J ψ)
→ (((ϕ J ψ)→ ϕ) J ψ)
an alternative axiomatization
for W◦ over L
X
(ψ χ⊤ J χ⊤)
↔ (ψ J χ)⊤
the scheme
collapsing JV and JS
W
(ϕ J ψ)
→ (( ψ → ϕ) J ψ)
its direct axiomatization
L◦a
(ϕ J ((ϕ J ψ)→ ψ))
J (ϕ J ψ)
a principle holding both
under JS and JV
4◦a (ϕ J ψ)→ (ϕ J (ϕ J ψ))
a principle deriving L◦a over
L
Figure 2: Relationships between logics axiomatized by either fixpoint principles or ax-
ioms obtained as fixpoints of simple formulas
Corollary 8.3. iGLP− does not prove JV and iGL−a does not prove JS.
Open Question 8.4. Can we find a logic below iGL−a and iGLP
− that extends iGL−
with explicit fixed points? We note that these fixed points would collapse into the
JV-fixed points on extension to iGL−a and into the JS-fixed points upon extension to
iGLP− or iGLW−. ❍
9 Four Salient Fixpoints: Subtheories of iA− ⊕ JS
There are four approaches to finding a nice axiomatization of iA− ⊕ JS: (i) a brilliant
flash of insight, (ii) trying out some salient fixed points and see whether they already
give us the desired scheme, (iii) analyzing what is shared between the iGLW−-proof of
JS and the iGLP−-proof and (iv) investigating what JS means in Kripke models.
In this section, we contribute to approach (iii), by computing four salient JS-fixed
points.
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9.1 The Principle W∗
The JS-fixed point of (p → ϕ) J ψ is modulo iA−-provable equivalence ϕ J ψ. The
fixed point equation is (ϕ J ψ) ↔ (((ϕ J ψ) → ϕ) J ψ). Modulo iA−-provable
equivalence this equation simplifies to the principle W∗:
W∗ (ϕ J ψ)→ (((ϕ J ψ)→ ϕ) J ψ)
Here is a first insight about W∗.
Theorem 9.1. Over iA⊕ CPC, the principle W∗ axiomatizes the same logic as 4 .
Proof. Over iA ⊕ CPC, ϕ J ψ collapses to (ϕ → ψ). See [LV18, Lemma 4.6]. This
tells us that over iA⊕ CPC the principle W∗ reduces to:
(†) (ϕ→ ψ)→ (( (ϕ→ ψ)→ ϕ)→ ψ).
Putting ϕ := ¬χ and ψ := ⊥, (†) gives us classically 4 , i.e., χ→ χ. Conversely,
we easily get (†) from 4 . ❑
Corollary 9.2. iA− ⊕W∗ does not imply L .
9.2 The Principle W◦
The JS-fixed point of (p∧ϕ) J ψ is modulo iA−-provable equivalence ϕ J ψ. The fixed
point equation is (ϕ J ψ) ↔ ((ϕ ∧ (ϕ J ψ)) J ψ). Modulo iA−-provable equivalence
this equation simplifies to the principle W◦:
W◦ ((ϕ ∧ (ϕ J ψ)) J ψ)→ (ϕ J ψ)
We note that, if we put ϕ := ⊤ in W◦, we get ( ψ J ψ) → ψ. This last, by
iA
−-reasoning, implies L .
Theorem 9.3. Over iA⊕ CPC, the principle W◦ axiomatizes the same logic as L .
Proof. By [LV18, Lemma 4.6], W◦ reduces to:
(†) ((ϕ ∧ (ϕ→ ψ))→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ)
By putting ϕ := ⊤ we find L modulo iA-provable equivalence. Conversely, it is easily
seen that (†) is iA-provably equivalent to an instance of L . ❑
Theorem 9.4. iA− ⊕ L ⊕W∗ ⊢W◦.
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Proof. We work in iA− ⊕ L ⊕W∗.
Let β := (ϕ ∧ (ϕ J ψ)). We want to show that we have (β J ψ)→ (ϕ J ψ). Assume
(a) ((β J ψ)→ (ϕ J ψ))
We apply W∗ with β in the role of ϕ and ψ in the role of ψ obtaining:
(b) (β J ψ)→ (((β J ψ)→ β) J ψ).
By (a) we have:
((β J ψ)→ β) L ((ϕ J ψ)→ (ϕ ∧ (ϕ J ψ)))
L ((ϕ J ψ)→ ϕ)
So (b) gives us:
(c) (β J ψ)→ (((ϕ J ψ)→ ϕ) J ψ).
From (c) it is immediate that (β J ψ)→ (ϕ J ψ).
Finally, we apply Lo¨b’s Rule and we are done. ❑
Theorem 9.5. iA− ⊕W◦ ⊢W∗.
Proof. We work in iA− ⊕W◦. We will use that we have L in this theory. Let α :=
(ϕ J ψ)→ ϕ. We want to show that (ϕ J ψ)→ (α J ψ). Assume
(a) ((ϕ J ψ)→ (α J ψ))
We apply W◦ with α in the role of ϕ and ψ in the role of ψ obtaining:
(b) ((α ∧ (α J ψ)) J ψ)→ (α J ψ).
By (a) we have:
(α ∧ (α J ψ)) L (((ϕ J ψ)→ ϕ) ∧ (ϕ J ψ))
L (ϕ ∧ (ϕ J ψ)).
So (b) gives us:
(c) ((ϕ ∧ (ϕ J ψ)) J ψ)→ (α J ψ).
From (c) it is immediate that (ϕ J ψ)→ (α J ψ).
Finally, we apply Lo¨b’s Rule and we are done. ❑
We define iGLW◦− := iA− ⊕W◦. We have already shown:
Theorem 9.6. i. iGLW◦− strictly extends iA− ⊕W∗.
ii. iGLW◦− is equal to iA− ⊕W∗ ⊕ L .
iii. iGLW◦− is contained in iA− ⊕ JS.
We also have:
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Theorem 9.7. iGLW◦− is incomparable to iGL−a .
Proof. Since iGLW◦− is contained in iGLP−, it cannot contain iGL−a . Conversely,
putting ϕ := ⊤ and ψ := ⊥, we see that iGLW◦− ⊢ ( ⊥ J ⊥) → ⊥. But by
Lemma 6.7, the logic iGL−a does not prove this. ❑
9.3 The Principle L◦
a
The JS-fixed point of ϕ J (p → ψ), where p does not occur in ϕ and ψ is, modulo
iA−-provable equivalence, ϕ J ψ. The fixed point equation is: (ϕ J ψ)↔ (ϕ J ((ϕ J
ψ)→ ψ)). Modulo iA−-provable equivalence this reduces to:
L◦a (ϕ J ((ϕ J ψ)→ ψ)) J (ϕ J ψ).
We note that putting ϕ := ⊤ in L◦a gives us precisely L .
We define iGL◦−a := iA
− ⊕ L◦a .
Theorem 9.8. iGLW◦− ⊢ L◦a . In other words, iGLW
◦− extends iGL◦−a .
Proof. In iGLW◦− we have:
(ϕ J ((ϕ J ψ)→ ψ)) → ((ϕ ∧ (ϕ J ψ)) J ψ)
→ ϕ J ψ ❑
9.4 The Principle 4◦a
The JS-fixed point of ϕ J (p ∧ ψ), where p does not occur in ϕ and ψ is, modulo
iA−-provable equivalence, ϕ J ψ. The fixed point equation is
(ϕ J ψ)↔ (ϕ J ((ϕ J ψ) ∧ ψ)).
Over iA− this simplifies to the following principle:
4◦a (ϕ J ψ)→ (ϕ J (ϕ J ψ))
Putting ϕ := ⊤ in 4◦a gives us precisely 4 .
Theorem 9.9. iGL◦−a ⊢ 4
◦
a.
Proof. We reason in iGL◦−a .
ϕ J ψ → ϕ J ((ϕ J (ψ ∧ (ϕ J ψ)))→ (ψ ∧ (ϕ J ψ)))
→ ϕ J (ψ ∧ (ϕ J ψ))
J ϕ J (ϕ J ψ) ❑
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Theorem 9.10. iA− ⊕ L ⊕ 4◦a ⊢ L
◦
a and hence iA
− ⊕ L ⊕ 4◦a coincides with iGL
◦−
a .
Proof. Let γ := ((ϕ J ψ)→ ψ). We have over iA− ⊕ L ⊕ 4◦a :
(ϕ J γ) ∧ ((ϕ J γ)→ (ϕ J ψ)) →
→ (ϕ J γ) ∧ ((ϕ J γ)→ (ϕ J ψ)) ∧ (ϕ J (ϕ J γ))
→ (ϕ J γ) ∧ (ϕ J (ϕ J ψ))
→ (ϕ J ψ)
We find the desired result by applying Lo¨b’s Rule. ❑
We note that we can interpret the unimodal Lo¨b system in iGL◦−a by reading ϕ J (·)
for the box.
Theorem 9.11. iGL−a ⊢ L
◦
a , i.e., iGL
−
a extends iGL
◦−
a .
Proof. We reason in iGL−a .
(ϕ J ((ϕ J ψ)→ ψ)) → (ϕ J ( ψ → ψ))
→ (ϕ J ψ) ❑
Corollary 9.12. iGL◦−a is strictly contained in iGLW
◦− and in iGL−a .
Proof. The strictness follows from the fact that iGL◦−a is contained in the incomparable
theories iGLW◦− and iGL−a . ❑
Open Question 9.13. Is iGLW◦− equal to iA− ⊕ JS and do systems such as iGLW◦−
or perhaps even iGL◦−a have explicit fixed points at all? ❍
Figure 2 summarizes the relationships between the theories studied. Theories that are
incomparable in the picture are really incomparable. As we see the main question left
open in the picture is the yes-or-no identity of iA− ⊕ JS and iGLW◦−.
10 Correspondence and Non-conservativity
We can now extend the list of known correspondences given in Theorem 3.3 and Figure
1 to several additional principles, whose importance has been highlighted by our study.
Theorem 10.1. In Kripke semantics, P corresponds to the transitivity of <.
Proof. Clearly transitivity implies P. Conversely, consider a frame F with nodes a <
b < c and a 6< c. We define x  p iff c  x, and x  q iff x 6 c. Clearly, c  p and
c 1 q, so a 1 (p J q). On the other hand, consider any z with a < z  p. It follows
that c  z. By our assumption z 6= c, so z 6 c. Ergo z  q. Thus, a  p J q. ❑
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Theorem 10.2. In Kripke semantics, 4◦a corresponds to gather-transitivity: if x <
y < z, then x < z or y  z.
Proof. Suppose F is gather-transitive. Consider any model on F . Suppose a  ϕ J ψ.
Suppose we have a < b < c and b  ϕ and c  ϕ. In case a < c, we have c  ψ and in
case b  c we also have c  ψ. Done.
Conversely, consider a frame F with a < b < c and (i) a 6< c and (ii) b 6 c. We define
x  p iff b  x or c  x, and x  q iff x 6 c. Clearly, b ⊢ p and c  p and c 1 q, so
a 1 (p J q). On the other hand, consider any z with a < z  p. It follows that b  z
or c  z. In case we would have z  c, it follows that either b  c or z = c. The first
possibility is excluded by (ii). The second possibility is excluded since it would follow
that a < c contradicting (i). Ergo, z 6 c and, so, z  q. Thus, a  p J q. ❑
In the presence of Di, we also have
44◦a (ϕ J (ψ J χ))→ (ϕ J (ψ J (ϕ J (ψ J χ)))).
Theorem 10.3. iA⊕ 4◦a ⊢ 44
◦
a .
Proof. We reason in iA⊕ 4◦a . First, 4
◦
a gives us that
ϕ J (ψ J χ) → ϕ J (ϕ J (ψ J χ)).
On the other hand, it also yields that
ϕ J (ψ J χ) → ϕ J (ψ J (ψ J χ)).
Now use Di to derive
ϕ J (ψ J χ) → ϕ J ((ϕ ∨ ψ) J (ψ J χ)).
. . . and now we use 4◦a again:
ϕ J (ψ J χ) → ϕ J ((ϕ ∨ ψ) J (ψ J χ))
→ ϕ J ((ϕ ∨ ψ) J ((ϕ ∨ ψ) J (ψ J χ)))
→ ϕ J (ψ J (ϕ J (ψ J χ))). ❑
Nevertheless, the above derivation crucially uses Di. It is a cautionary tale that the
Kripke correspondence conditions lose some of their importance for extensions of iA−
which do not extend iA.
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Theorem 10.4. iA− ⊕ 4◦a 0 44
◦
a.
Proof. We use algebraic semantics for this purpose. A smallest possible, 6-element
countermodel found by the program Mace4 [McC03] is provided in the appendix. Its
Heyting reduct looks as follows:
a1 = ⊤
ϕ = a2
✉✉✉✉✉✉
a4
■■■■■■
= ψ
a5
❏❏❏❏❏❏
tttttt
a3 = χ
a0 = ⊥
ttttt
Some key fact about the definition of J are:
• For every a 6= ⊤, ⊤ J a = ⊥;
• a3 J a2 = ⊥;
• a5 J ⊥ = a5 J a3 = a4 J a3 = a4;
• a2 J ⊥ = a2 J a3 = a5;
• a2 J a4 = a2 J a5 = a2.
Note that via a4 J a3 and a2 J a3 one can disprove Di. ❑
11 Explicit Fixpoints and the Beth Property
It has been shown first by Maximova [Mak89] that explicit fixpoints yield the Beth
definability property and subsequent literature provides further investigation of this
phenomenon [AHdJ98, Hoo01]. For constructive J-logics, this argument has already
been made by Iemhoff et al. [IDJZ05, § 4.3]. Hence, we simply state as an observation
that any logic which extends either iA−⊕ JS or i-GLa = iA
−⊕ JV enjoys this property.
12 Conclusions and Future Work
This paper has studied the surprisingly complex first stage of construction of guarded
fixpoints: for formulas whose principal connective is J itself. Even its restricted scope
has left some questions unanswered. In follow-up work, we will investigate the question
of how to extend the definability result from a restricted class of formulas to a wider
one, including the computational cost of such extensions; syntactic setup necessary for
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that purpose (inspired by and generalizing that of [dJV91]; the issue of commuting
resulting fixpoints operators with substitutions has intriguing Beck-Chevalley aspects)
would distract too much from the main goal of the present paper. In particular, we
have mentioned that classically, it is possible to use elimination of guarded fixpoints
for elimination of positive fixpoints of ordinary µ-calculus [VB06, Vis05]. Further-
more, is possible to define a portmanteau notion of semipositive formulas (where every
occurrence of p is either guarded or positive), which in general allow explicit locally
minimal fixpoints [Vis05]. It is possible to generalize such results to the intuitionistic
setting, but the techniques and results involved are more demanding.
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Countermodel used in the proof of Theorem 10.4
The description follows the input format of Mace4 [McC03]. We ignore ∨. The con-
nective J is represented as +, whereas→ is represented as ∗. The numbers correspond
to indices used in the main text.
formulas(assumptions).
x ^ (y ^ z) = (x ^ y) ^ z.
x ^ x = x.
x ^ y = y ^ x.
x ^ 1 = x.
x ^ 0 = 0.
x * x = 1.
x ^ (x * y) = x ^ y.
y ^ (x * y) = y.
x * (y ^ z) = (x * y) ^ (x * z).
(x + y) ^ (x + z) = x + (y ^ z).
((x + y) ^ (y + z)) ^ (x + z) = (x + y) ^ (y + z).
x + x = 1.
(x + y) ^ (x + (x + y)) = x + y.
end of list.
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formulas(goals).
(x + (y + z)) ^ (x + (y + (x + (y + z)))) = x + (y + z).
end of list.
formulas(mace4_clauses).
x ^ (y ^ z) = (x ^ y) ^ z.
x ^ x = x.
x ^ y = y ^ x.
x ^ 1 = x.
x ^ 0 = 0.
x * x = 1.
x ^ (x * y) = x ^ y.
x ^ (y * x) = x.
x * (y ^ z) = (x * y) ^ (x * z).
(x + y) ^ (x + z) = x + (y ^ z).
((x + y) ^ (y + z)) ^ (x + z) = (x + y) ^ (y + z).
x + x = 1.
(x + y) ^ (x + (x + y)) = x + y.
(c1 + (c2 + c3)) ^ (c1 + (c2 + (c1 + (c2 + c3)))) != c1 + (c2 + c3).
end of list.
interpretation( 6, [number=1, seconds=8], [
function(c1, [ 2 ]),
function(c2, [ 4 ]),
function(c3, [ 3 ]),
function(∗( , ), [
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,
0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
3, 1, 1, 3, 4, 4,
2, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2,
0, 1, 2, 3, 1, 2,
3, 1, 1, 3, 1, 1 ]),
function(+( , ), [
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,
0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0,
5, 1, 1, 5, 2, 2,
0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0,
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0, 1, 0, 4, 1, 0,
4, 1, 1, 4, 1, 1 ]),
function(ˆ( , ), [
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
0, 2, 2, 0, 5, 5,
0, 3, 0, 3, 3, 0,
0, 4, 5, 3, 4, 5,
0, 5, 5, 0, 5, 5 ])
]).
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